00100		CHAPTER ONE -THE PARANOID MODE 
00200	%1.1  The concept of paranoia
00300		Like ourselves, ancient Greeks liked to call one another paranoid.
00400	The term `paranoia' (Gr.:para=beside; nous = mind) was a lay rather than
00500	a medical term which referred to states of craziness and mental deterioration.
00600	For two thousand years the term did not appear in the classification schemes
00700	of mental disorders. [Menninger et al.] Historians do not seem curious about
00800	what persons with persecutory delusions were called all this time. (It is
00900	doubtful that there weren't any.) In the 18th century the term reappears
01000	in German classifications to refer to delusional states which were
01100	considered disorders of intellect rather than emotion. [Lewis ].
01200		Little agreement about its  usuage was reached until the present
01300	time when it has achieved adjectival status as in paranoid personality and
01400	paranoid psychosis. Currently the term is used to refer to the presence
01500	of delusions, false beliefs. Some users include any sort of delusion
01600	but mainly the delusions are persecutory. Somatic, erotic, grandeur and
01700	jealousy delusions are identified as such without terming the condition
01800	paranoid.
01900	
02000	% 1.2 The paranoia of everday life
02100	   I shall contrast two modes of information-processing activity,
02200	one termed `ordinary' and one termed `paranoid'.
02300	   In the ordinary mode a person goes about his business of everyday
02400	living in a matter-of-fact way. He deals with routine situations in his
02500	environment as they arise, in the main taking things at their face value.
02600	Things and people behave in accordance with his belief-expectations and
02700	thus can be managed routinely. Only a small amount of attention need be
02800	devoted to monitoring the environment simple checking that everthing is
02900	as expected. This placid ongoing state-sequence can be interrupted by the
03000	the detection of signs of alarm or opportunity at any time but the 
03100	predominant condition is one of a steady progression of events so ordinary
03200	as to be uneventful.
03300	   In contrast to this routine ordinariness is an arousal state of
03400	emergency for various reasons. The particular aroused emergency we shall
03500	be considering here constitutes the paranoid mode of information-processing
03600	characterized by a wary suspiciousness. 
03700	In extreme cases paranoid patients 
03800	conceive and describe themselves as being at war with others and the warfare is
03900	unrelieved lest the self be overwhelmed. A person continously dominated
04000	by the paranoid mode can be compared to a spy in a hostile country.
04100	To him every new person is a potential enemy, a threat to his existence
04200	who must be evaluated for malevolence or harmlessness. The secret agent
04300	is fully  mobilized to attack, to flee, to stalk. In this
04400	situation appearances are not to be taken at face value as ordinary events
04500	or background but each is attended to and interpreted to detect malevolence.
04600	Events in the environment, which in the ordinary mode would not be connected
04700	to the self, become referred to the self. The unintended is misinterpreted as
04800	intended and the undesigned is confused with the designed. Nothing is
04900	disattendible. The predominant intention of the agent is to detect malevolence from others. 
05000	In paranoid patients the over-riding belief in and expectation of malevolence on the part of others
05100	keeps the self in an aroused alarm state , a state which occurs only as
05200	an interrupt in the ordinary mode of information processing.
05300	     MORE HERE ON EVERDAY PARANOIA
05400	
05500	% 1.3 Characteristics of clinical paranoias
05600		Observations made by clinicians on paranoid thought and action
05700	have been thoroughly described in the psychiatric literature. An extensive 
05800	account can be found in [Swanson].  Only those phenomena
05900	the model attempts to account for will be outlined.  They are limited to 
06000	what occurs in the episode of a teletyped psychiatric interview.
06100	In such an interview the interviewer  cannot see or hear the patient.  The  
06200	model does not simulate the `paranoid stare' nor the intonations of 
06300	indignation observable  in vocal communication. Thus the model is circumscribed in what it attempts to explain.
06400	
06500	     
06600		The major phenomena  requiring explanation consist of suspiciousness,
06700	self-reference, hypersensitivity, fearfulness ,
06800	hostility and rigidity.
06900	
07000	
07100	Suspiciousness
07200	
07300	
07400	     The primary property of the clinical paranoid mode consists of 
07500	suspiciousness of others based on malevolence beliefs.  The patient believes 
07600	others have evil intentions towards him. He is convinced others try to bring about 
07700	undesirable states in himself such as humiliation, harassment, injury
07800	and even death.  In a two-person communication he may report such beliefs
07900	directly or ,if he is guarded , they will only be hinted at.  Disclosure may
08000	depend upon how the interviewer responds in the dialogue to reports of 
08100	fluctuating suspicions or absolute convictions of malevolence.
08200	     The patient may vary in his own estimate of his malevolence beliefs.
08300	If they consist of suspicions, he may have moments of rational doubt in
08400	which he tries to reject them as ill-founded.  But if the beliefs represent
08500	absolute convictions, he does not struggle to dismiss them.  They become
08600	pre-conditions for countering actions against tormentors who wish and
08700	try to do him evil.  He seeks affirmation of his beliefs, sympathy , and 
08800	allies in positions of power such as clinicians or lawyers to help him
08900	take action.
09000	     The conceptual content of the malevolence beliefs may involve a 
09100	specifc Other person or a conspiracy of others such as the Mafia, the 
09200	FBI, Communists. The patient sees himself literally as patient (one who suffers or undergoes) 
09300	rather than agent. Other agents  subject him to, make him an object of, their evil
09400	intentions.  At times the conceptual content of the beliefs are not 
09500	directly expressed in a dialogue.  The patient may be so mistructful of 
09600	how their disclusure might be used against him that he cautiously feels 
09700	his way through an interview offering only hints which the clinician
09800	uses to infer the presence of delusions.
09900	
10000	     A clinician faces the task of distinguishing whether the malevolence
10100	beliefs are true, false or pretense.  Some malevolence beliefs are 
10200	justified but they are secondary constructions arising from the paranoids
10300	tendency to provoke others to the point where they in fact display 
10400	hostility towards him.
10500	
10600	
10700	Self-Reference and Hypersensitivity
10800	
10900	
11000	     The patient believes many more events in the world pertain to 
11100	himself than seems justified to other observers.  For example, he is convinced that 
11200	newspaper headlines are directly personally at him or that the statements
11300	of radio announcers contian special messages for him.  Thus he
11400	hypersensitively reads himself into situations which are not intended to
11500	pertain to him and his particular concerns.
11600	     The references to the Self are usually interpreted as malevolent
11700	conceptually.  He may believe he is being observed and influenced by 
11800	others with evil intentions.
11900	
12000	     References to the Self are interpreted as slurs, slights or unfair 
12100	judgements.  He may feel he is being observed, stared at and even 
12200	mysteriously influenced.  In crowds he believes he is intentionally
12300	bumped and on the highway he feels repeatedly tail-gaited.  Bombarded
12400	without relief by all these wrongs , he becomes hyperirritable and guarrelsome.
12500	     He is touchy about certain topics, flaring up when linguistic 
12600	representations of particular concepts appear in the conversation.  For
12700	example, remarks about his age, religion, or family, or sexlife may set
12800	him off.  Even when these areas are touched upon without reference to him,
12900	e.g. religion in general, he takes it personally.  When a delusional 
13000	complex is present, linguistic terms far removed but still connectible to
13100	the complex act as flares.  Thus a man holding beliefs that the Mafia 
13200	intend to harm him, a remark about Italy might cause him to react in a 
13300	suspicious or hostile manner.
13400	
13500	Affect-Expression
13600	
13700	     The major affects expressed, both verbally and nonverbally, are 
13800	those of fear and anger.  The patient may be fearful of physical attack
13900	and injury even to the point of death.  He fears others wish to subjugate
14000	and control him.  His fear is justified in his mind by the many physical
14100	threats he detects in the conduct of others towards him.  His chronic
14200	irritability becomes punctuated with outbursts of raging tirades and 
14300	diatribes.  When he feels he is being overwhelmed he may in desperation
14400	physically attack others.
14500	     The experienced and expressed affects of fear and anger blend with
14600	one another in varying proportions to yield an unpleasant negative affect
14700	state made continuous by fantasy rehearsals and retellings of past wrongs.
14800	Depending on his interpretation of malevolent input, the patient may 
14900	move away from others in being guarded, secretive and evasive and then
15000	may suddenly jump at others with sarcastic accusatoriness and 
15100	argumentativeness.  His affect-states become chained into loops with 
15200	those others in his life space who take censoring action towards him because
15300	of his uncommunicativeness or outbursts.
15400	
15500	     While seldom if ever expressed, and thus not observed clinically,
15600	we believe the affect of humiliation plays a crucial role in the paranoid mode, 
15700	as will be discussed (p. ). One of the assumptions of the model to 
15800	be presented consists of an overall principle of minimizing humiliation, 
15900	preventing a further reduction in self-esteem through experienced humiliation.
16000	
16100	Rigidity
16200	
16300	     Among the chief properties of clinically observed paranoia are those 
16400	phenomena which may be characterized as indicators of rigidity.  The
16500	patients beliefs in his sensitive areas remain fixed, difficult to 
16600	influence by evidence or persuasion.  The patient himself makes few 
16700	verification attempts to which might disconfirm his convictions.  To
16800	change a belief is to admit being wrong.  To forgive others also opens
16900	a crack in the wall of righteousness.  He does not apologize nor accept
17000	apology.  He stubbornly follows rules to the letter and his literal
17100	interpretations of regulations can drive others wild.  It is this quality 
17200	of rigidity and fixity which makes the treatment of paranoia by 
17300	psychological methods so difficult.
17400	
17500	1.4         Theories of  Paranoia
17600	
17700	     While paranoid processes represent a disorder at one level, the 
17800	observable regularities of the disorder imply an underlying order at 
17900	another level.  Attempts to explain, to make intelligible, the order 
18000	behind the disorder , have been offered since antiquity.  Scientific 
18100	explanations do not stand alone in isolation.  They are evaluated relative
18200	to rival contenders for the position of `best available'.
18300	
18400	     Theories stem from two sources, from hypotheses suggested by the 
18500	structure of the phenomena themselves and from modifications of previous
18600	theories (bequeathed myths of the field). Each generation develops new explanatory theories by discovering
18700	new phenomena or by modifying predecessor theories.  The old theories are
18800	unsatisfactory or only partially satisfactory because they are found to 
18900	contain anomalies  or contradictions which must be removed.  Sometimes
19000	previous theories are viewed as lacking evidential support by current standards.
19100	Theories are mainly superseded rather than disproved.  The new versions
19200	try to remove the contradictions,increase  comprehensiveness or gain evidential
19300	support.
19400	     Theories offered as scientific explanations should be (a) systematic
19500	(i.e. coherent and consistent) and (b) empirically testable.  Many
19600	psychological formulations about the paranoid mode do not meet these 
19700	criteria.  For example, to account for paranoid thought process by 
19800	citing a constitutional inadequacy or an imbalance of intellect and affect
19900	is to be so global and  untestable as to not merit discussion.
20000	What is needed as an explanation of the right type is a structure of 
20100	symbol processing mechanisms, strategies, functions or procedures which is capable of producing
20200	the observable regularities of the paranoid mode. Here I am using the term
20300	"mechanism" in its broadest sense which is  common in
20400	the jargon of computer science. However this broad use of the term
20500	"mechanism" may unintentionally imply a  mechanistic philosophy
20600	which views the world as consisting basically of particles obeying  laws
20700	of motion. Some biologists and psychologists share this viewpoint in
20800	spite of the fact that physics itself for the past 50 years has been
20900	moving away from the classical mechanics of particles in motion towards fields
21000	and wave functions as more appropriate explanatory concepts. In psychiatry it is
21100	still useful to view some things which happen to a man in mechanical terms. But
21200	a man is not only a passive recipient, subject to Newtons's laws, he
21300	is also an active agent, a language user who thereby can monitor
21400	himself, control himself, direct himself, comment on and criticize these performances.
21500	Modern psychiatric theory must offer an account of man as agent as 
21600	well as patient and come to grips with those enigmatic cases in which
21700	what happens to a man can be a consequence of what he has done.
21800	     Let us consider some explanations alternate to that of 
21900	our model, starting in the late 19th century.  (Historians can certainly find notions of 
22000	intentions, affects and beliefs as far back as  Aristotle, who seldom quoted
22100	his sources.  
22200	`Everything has been said before but it has to be said again because
22300	nobody listens'(Gide)). In 1896 Freud [ ] proposed a theory at least of the right 
22400	type, a sort of symbol-processing explanation which postulated a defensive strategy
22500	or mechanism to explain persecutory paranoia [ ].  He assumed the believed persecution of the 
22600	Self by Others to represent projected Self-reproaches for childhood 
22700	masturbation.  Today hardly anyone finds this explanation plausible but 
22800	the concepts of defense  and projection, not original with Freud but
22900	made popular by him, have survived.
23000	     Around the turn of the century, Fliess (according to Jones[ ]) proposed in letters to Freud
23100	that paranoid thought stemmed from an unconscious homosexual conflict. 
23200	Freud embraced this idea whole-heartedly and in 1910 [ ] developed it in terms of 
23300	transformations being applied to the basic propostion `I (a man) love him.'
23400	He postulated this proposition to be so intolerable as not to be admitted
23500	to consciousness and therefore subjected to being transformed unconsciously,
23600	first into `I do not love him, I hate him' which in turn was transformed
23700	into the conscious belief `He hates me' with the accompanying conclusion
23800	`Therefore I am justified in hating him'.
23900	     In modern terms this explanation offers a set of strategies ,functions or 
24000	procedures which progressively distort symbolic-structures.  It is thus 
24100	the right type of explanation we are searching for.  Great difficulty has 
24200	been encountered in testing the theory since there is no agreed-on method
24300	for detecting the presence of unconscious homosexual conflict.  The 
24400	explanation is also inconsistent with another of Freud's ideas that 
24500	everyone harbors unconscious homosexual conflicts. But everyone does 
24600	does not become paranoid. To reconcile the
24700	inconsistency one would have to postulate some additional, possibly 
24800	quantitative factors, to explain the intensity and extent of the paranoid
24900	mode in certain people.
25000	     The current state of the homosexual-conflict explanation is a doubtful
25100	one.  But as will be discussed, it may contain a grain of truth-likelihood as a 
25200	limiting case for a more general theory of the paranoid mode.                               
25300	Freud's [ego and id] later attempts at the
25400	explanation of paranoia assumed simply that love was transformed into hate
25500	This notion is too vague, general, and incomplete an articulation to 
25600	qualify for a contemporary dialectics of explanation which reqires a more
25700	precisely defined organization of functions to account for such a transformation.
25800	     Tomkins [ ] in 196?  proposed an information-processing theory of the 
25900	paranoid posture articulated in terms of defensive strategies,
26000	transformations ,and maximizing-minimizing principles.  He viewed the
26100	paranoid mode as an attempt to cope with humiliation. He proposed that a person whose 
26200	information processing is monopolized by the paranoid mode is in a 
26300	permanent state of vigilance, trying to maximize the detection of insult
26400	and to minimize humiliation.
26500		"The major source of distortion in his interpretation is
26600		 in his insistence on processing all information as though 
26700		 it were relevant only to the possibility of humiliation."
26800	     The hypotheses of Tomkin's  theory, stated in essay form, are difficult to 
26900	test for their consistency and for their empirical correspondence.  But 
27000	as will be shown,, we have, with some modifications, incorporated   several of them in our model.
27100	By conjoining them with other hypotheses to form a collaboration of elements in a working model we can 
27200	enhance their testability both logically and empirically.
27300	     In 1970 Swanson et al.[ ] in a book on paranoia portrayed
27400	how a `homeostatic' individual attempts to deal with `bewildering 
27500	perceptions'.  They postulated that a person in homeostatic
27600	equilibrium perceives a pronounced inner or outer change which is 
27700	inexplicable or unacceptable.  The resultant disequilibrium is so 
27800	bewildering that in order to restore equilibrium, the person constructs
27900	a paranoid explanation which attributes the cause of the change, not to 
28000	the Self, but to an external source.  With the cause of the change 
28100	identified , bewilderment is abolished an uncertainty reduced.
28200	     Elements of this formulation represent  plausible symbol-processing
28300	strategies particularly in cases of paranoid thinkng associated with the 
28400	`pronounced changes' of organic brain damage or amphetamine psychosis.
28500	These are conditions which happen to a man.
28600	In paranoid states, reactions or personalities where no pronounced
28700	physical change can be identified ,the formulation is inadequate and must
28800	be filled out with more specific transformations. However the                                      	
28900	theory does emphasize intentionalistic strategies which we also believe must play a part
29000	in a model of human thought processes.
29100	     In sum, the rival theories of paranoia here reviewed have not gained
29200	widespread acceptance because of various weaknesses and limitations.
29300	No reigning and unified theory of paranoia is widely accepted today.
29400	In such a pre-consensus state the field is wide open for contenders. We shall be proposing a 
29500	simulation model as a candidate explanation intended to be more explicit, 
29600	systematic, consistent  and testable than the theories   described above.
29700	The model combines hypotheses of these previous contributions with hypotheses
29800	and assumptions of our own into a coherent unified explanatory system.